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"韩版腾讯"一场大火：韩国一夜退回石器时代 沦陷整整4天_我的网站

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    Tian Xuan Photo: Courtesy of Tian
In economic theory, "overcapacity" - for which no universally accepted definition exists - is inherently a recurring feature of the market economy's dynamic "balance - imbalance - rebalance" cycle. The Western narrative that equates China's sizable production capacity directly with "overcapacity" defies economic logic and rigor; in reality, it represents a politicization of trade and economic issues.
First, it confuses the concepts of "capacity scale" and "overcapacity." China's overall industrial capacity utilization remains within a reasonable range. Periodically lower utilization in traditional sectors reflects a normal adjustment as these industries advance toward high-end, intelligent, and green production. Ample capacity in certain emerging industries is precisely what meets surging global demand for high-end, smart, and green solutions. Therefore, equating scale with excess is typical equivocation.
Second, "overcapacity" itself is a dynamic feature of market economies, where no fixed balance persists indefinitely. Judging capacity based solely on static snapshots violates basic economic principles.
Third, it is erroneous to simplistically link trade surpluses or industrial subsidies to overcapacity, while ignoring the macro context of global specialization and cross-border savings-investment structures. It also disregards the reality that reasonable capacity utilization ranges differ across economies at varying stages of development. Imposing a single standard on China is neither scientific nor rigorous.
China's global competitiveness in green technology stems from sustained, large-scale investment in innovation, a comprehensive industrial and supply chain system, massive application scenarios, and intense market competition - not from alleged government subsidies. After decades of long-cycle R&D, Chinese industries have achieved breakthroughs in core technologies such as power batteries and photovoltaic modules.
During the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-25), China's nationwide R&D spending grew at an average annual rate of 10 percent. Economies of scale have continuously diluted production costs. China's ultra-large domestic market and full-chain supporting ecosystem provide an optimal testing ground for new technologies - from pilot verification to mass deployment. With more than 200 million market entities driving fierce competition, enterprises are constantly compelled to cut costs, raise efficiency, and upgrade products, thereby forging dual advantages in price and performance that we see today.
There is no direct causation between subsidies and overcapacity. Industrial subsidies are a globally recognized practice, typically aimed at correcting market failures and advancing critical technologies. China's subsidies are granted on an impartial basis to all types of market entities, in full compliance with WTO rules, and have not triggered disorderly capacity expansion.
Currently, capacity utilization in China's green industries remains within a reasonable range. Support is primarily directed toward R&D, technological breakthroughs, and consumer-side incentives through market-based mechanisms - not toward fueling overcapacity. Crucially, China's high-quality capacity has reduced the global cost of green transition, representing an opportunity rather than a shock to world development.
Against the backdrop of global carbon neutrality goals, labeling China's new energy capacity as "overcapacity" is entirely untenable. According to the International Energy Agency, global data center electricity consumption will approach 1 trillion kWh by 2030, with 40 percent of incremental power needing to come from renewables. Demand for wind power, photovoltaics, power batteries, and related green energy solutions remains far from saturated - so claims of "overcapacity" are groundless.
China's capacity plays a central role in advancing the global energy transition. Over the past decade, the levelized cost of electricity from wind and solar globally has fallen by more than 60 percent and 80 percent respectively - improvements largely attributable to Chinese innovation and manufacturing, which have directly lowered the cost threshold for worldwide green transformation.
The US journal Science crowned the global renewable energy surge led by China among its Top 10 Breakthroughs of 2025. Leveraging its technological and scale advantages, China is well positioned to supply abundant, high-quality green energy equipment and solutions, meet fast-growing renewable demand from data centers, industrial production, and other sectors, and tangibly support countries in implementing the Paris Agreement. In short, China is a pivotal force driving the global low-carbon transition.
The so-called "China Shock 2.0" is fundamentally a protectionist narrative rooted in Cold War thinking - a politically motivated claim inconsistent with facts. The rapid development of China's modern industries is driven by innovation and sustained institutional reform, not by dumping allegedly excess capacity abroad. Rather than posing a shock, China's industrial progress offers a "China Opportunity 2.0." It delivers multiple dividends to global development - innovation dividends, market dividends, and growth dividends - while injecting stability and vitality into global industrial chains through an open and win-win approach.
China's high-quality green and high-tech exports have tangibly accelerated the global green transition and reduced production costs worldwide. Meanwhile, as the world's largest goods consumption market and the second-largest importer for 17 consecutive years, China provides enormous market opportunities for economies around the globe. Moreover, China's open-source collaboration and technology sharing in frontier fields such as artificial intelligence and the digital economy enable developing countries to bridge the digital divide at lower cost and share in the benefits of the technological revolution.
The facts demonstrate that China's emerging technologies and products represent a "China Opportunity 2.0" - driving global technological progress, accelerating the green transition, improving livelihoods across nations, and bolstering the industrialization of developing economies. This open and mutually beneficial cooperation stands as the true engine of global economic recovery and sustainable development. 
This article is compiled based on an interview with Tian Xuan, dean at the Guanghua School of Management and Boya Distinguished Professor of Finance of Peking University. [email protected]

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B |     但，就是这么一个占据了韩国互联网的“全壁江山”的存在，突然就断网了，而且这一断就是 4 天。10 月 15 号，大韩民国的四千万网民们好像突然进入了“ 石器时代 ”，交流全靠吼（ 聊天软件崩了 ），恰饭全靠以物易物（ 支付软件用不了了 ）。就连技术含量不高，但是对商业合作意义重大的邮件交流环节，也被封印了 4 天之久。这完全是“ 末日流 ”小说的打开方式。直到韩国网络逐渐恢复了大家才发现，原来是韩国的一个数据中心着火，导致 kakao 的服务器瘫痪了。据韩国警方消息，起火地点为数据中心 A 栋地下 3 层电气室的锂电池架附近。电源堆放在五个电池架上，事发时，其中一个锂电池产生了火花并引发火灾。不过这也没啥，本来断网就是个小事，谁家服务器不宕机啊。你看，新浪微博一有热点，CEO 就需要出去租服务器，B站、微信这些大平台也没少被吐槽。崩了不要紧，关键在于正常企业崩几个小时，就已经算十年一遇了。

C | 结果，kakao一崩就是4天。最惨的是，在同一次火灾里断网的平台 NAVER，只花了 4 小时就修好了，这让花了足足 4 天的 kakao 还怎么甩锅？于是，kakao 迎接了韩国人积蓄已久的愤怒。毕竟在首尔，kakao 无处不在。

D | 几乎每个人都需要这家公司的应用程序，来发送消息、出租车、导航和支付。

E | Kakao Talk不仅是韩国最大的即时通讯应用，旗下的 Kakao Pay 也是目前韩国最大的电子钱包工具，目前用户总量已达 3600 万，相当于每 10 个韩国人就有7个在用 Kakao Pay。

F | 在出行方面，Kakao 也控制了韩国全国近 4 成出租车，以及 96.1% 的网约车用户。

G | 甚至，包括这上述软件在内的 8 款国民级应用，只能通过 kakao 的账号登陆。所以啊，kakao 凉了 4 天，基本相当于“ 消灭了韩国人民的精神文化生活 ”。幻想一下，你失去了美团、百度、支付宝、以及微信和 QQ 的生活，你就能体会到同样的愤怒。

H | 有韩国网友将这个经历形象比喻成 100 万倍的导弹攻击。而那些暴躁老哥们，已经在线骂街了。科技评论家 Kim Good-hyun，更是把这个事件的讨论，变成更严肃的思考：别的没有也就算了，但是现在 kakao 搞得大家连健康码都没法扫了，这已经是 “ 公共卫生事件 ” 了。

I | Kim说：“Kakao应用程序在该国发挥着准政府作用，例如，在处理新冠肺炎疫情或从政府办公室发送通知方面。”在疫情高峰期，KakaoTalk与韩国疾病控制和预防局合作，提供二维码扫描和数字疫苗证书等应用程序内功能。在疫情期间，这些功能在日常生活中变得至关重要，因为它们被要求进入大型超市和餐馆。关于这一点，想必大家深有体会。不过，事情都发展到这一步，作为一家大企业了，基本的危机公关还是能搞的。

J | 在服务器全面宕机后，官方确实也做出了大量的补救：除了迅速恢复服务功能外，还针对部分付费服务进行了赔偿。

K | 比如 kakao旗下的游戏部门 Kakao Games，就在 17 日宣布对旗下的《 奥丁：神叛 》、《 公主连线 》等主要游戏进行补偿，所有玩家都能收到官方送出的丰厚游戏道具奖励。另外，官方还建立了一个负责中心，专门就用户的损失进行记录和赔偿。甚至于，管理层直接把联席 CEO 都给开了。本来吧，kakao 要是保持这种诚恳的话，说不定这事情就完结了，互联网没有记忆嘛。

L | 但是万万没想到，在影响最大的 Kakao Talk 通讯板块，kakao 公司却傲慢地表示：Kakao Talk 作为免费软件，在法律层面上并不需要背负相关责任。差评君一口盐汽水差点就喷了出来，亏一个小目标已经是没跑的了，市值也掉了 1000 亿了，竟然还想着省钱止损，这是把韩国人 “ 白嫖党 ” 当??啊。就这傲慢的态度和抠搜的财务，难怪 kakao 能断网 4 天。给数据中心做备份的钱，估摸着都被他们省下来了。

M | 连我都这么生气了，韩国人早就都已经裂开了。这时候，靠对话已经没用了，直接身体力行反抗kakao就完了。在周末停电期间，Kakao talk 的用户直接流失 800 万，人们开始使用 Facebook 的 Messenger 、Telegram 和 Naver's Line 等其他替代品。Telegram 在推特上嘲笑 Kakao，说：“ 我们欢迎我们的新韩国用户，并希望他们能享受 Telegram 多数据中心基础设施的稳定性。

N | ”一名总部位于首尔的律师 Shin Jae-Youn 正带领民众准备对 Kakao 提起集体诉讼：无论火灾的原因是什么，都可以就 Kakao 的疏忽没有提前为这种情况做好准备而向 Kakao 提出损害赔偿要求。目前，Shin 的社区已经有大约 137 名成员，其中大多数是企业主和公司员工。

o | 这一系列的变故，使得整个韩国从对 kakao 的吐槽，演变成了一次反 kakao 的浪潮。铺天盖地的民意，也正好给了韩国政府大搞反垄断的机会。在此之前，韩国垄断势力和反垄断的碰撞已经闹的沸沸扬扬的了。起先，面对韩国内部根深蒂固的财团势力，韩国政府并没有冒进（ 甚至可能之间就吃过苦头 ），而是机智的拿海外互联网巨头们练手。2016 年，韩国政府给“ 专利流氓--高通 ”开出 8.6 亿美元的罚单，成为韩国垄断史上的丰碑之后，反垄断业务就一发不可收拾了。

p | 随后韩国更是趁热打铁，2021 年通过修订《 电信业务法 》在法律层面禁止了苹果、谷歌强制要求开发者使用其固定支付渠道的做法。也就是说，App Store 和 Google Play 的抽成不再是必选项，应用开发者有了更多的选择，把国内游戏商都馋坏了。虽然不久后，苹果上马了反制措施，表示第三方支付的交易依然需要 26% 的抽成。但是，作为全球第一个朝“ 苹果税 ”开枪的国家，可见韩国反垄断的决心。不过相较于三星在国际反垄断上的硬气，对内，韩国政府就有点弱鸡了。

q | 虽然韩国公正委从 2020 年就开始推进制定网络平台审查指南，但由于无法完成利害相关者的利益协调，至今无法落地。简单来说，还是反对的力量太强大。（ 是谁咱就不说了，懂得都懂 ）最后还是总统尹锡悦充当和事佬，叫停了官方制定审查指南的工作，而是用“ 平台制定自律规范 ”的方式代替。不过“ 自律 ”这说辞，咋越看越像“ 失败方的遮羞布 ”呢？峰回路转，这一回，Kakao 服务瘫痪事故算是为反垄断提供了名分，韩国重新启动平台审查指南的计划。

r | 甚至之前一直强调“企业的自由”的总统尹锡悦都改口了：Kakao服务中断的影响“ 与国家通信网络中断没有区别 ”，如果出现操纵市场的垄断或寡头现象，“ 我们需要从国家层面采取系统性措施，来维护国民的利益 ”。这也是韩国总统历史上第一次提及“ 反垄断问题 ”。而韩国执政党和在野党更是久违地达成了共识：表示将立法，推动 Kakao 等一定规模以上的数据中心纳入国家的管理之中。

s | 一个 kakao，竟然让一直互相看不对眼的韩国人民、执政党和在野党团结起来了，这一回够 kakao 喝一壶的了。

t | 今后，恐怕有好戏看了。

u | 不过，想通过这次集体对 kakao 的声讨，就解决互联网领域的垄断问题，可能不太现实。毕竟，唇亡齿寒，这些财团之间可能有矛盾，但大概率不会对反垄断的改革坐视不管。但是这种垄断，尤其是互联网端的垄断日益的加剧，对国家、对行业、对普通老百姓都是一种压榨。我们都知道，在行业生态里，更多的厂商进入，才能维持生态平衡。只有良性竞争才能为行业的发展注入源源不断的养分。不然就会出现傲慢如 kakao 的一幕，之前不够坚定的韩国人，已经吃到苦果了。

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